JUDICIALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE TRIAL-TYPE HEARING AND THE
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The judicialization of the administrative process, a phenomenon largely taken for granted by both lawyers and the general public in contemporary
America, is probably one of the most mysterious, yet significant, features of
American government. It is significant because of its increasingly recognized cost and because of the dominant role which it assigns to lawyers. 1 It
is mysterious because of the fragile constitutional underpinnings upon which
the judicialization was originally based, 2 and because of its remarkable
endurance and growth.'
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THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEGAL
SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955)[hereinafter cited as HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT];
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK
FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955)[hereinafter cited as HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT];
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.CHI. L. REV. 28
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw].
1. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 191-230 (1976); Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers,
HARPER'S, October 1976, at 37.
2. Just why the ultimate availability of judicial relief against allegedly illegal administrative action does not satisfy due process requirements has never been made quite clear, despite
the elaborate explanations generated by such decisions as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). A wrong turn may have been taken in the little-noticed case of Goldsmith v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926), in which the petitioner had been refused admission to
practice before the Board. He sought mandamus, alleging satisfaction of Board requirements
for admission. The Board filed an answer asserting facts concerning petitioner's reputation
which appeared legally to justify their refusal of admission. The petitioner did not deny those
facts, but asserted that they were unreliable "hearsay." The lower court denied mandamus on
the ground that the evidentiary hearings did not indicate illegal exercise of discretion by the
Board. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 4 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1925). The Supreme Court
held that the discretionary power to deny admission meant "a discretion to be exercised after
fair investigation, with such a notice, hearing and opportunity to answer for the applicant as
would constitute due process." 270 U.S. at 123. The Court then pointed out that the petitioner
had not demanded the procedure which the Court, apparently for the first time, was declaring
applicable through a highly artificial interpretation of the meaning of the word "discretion,"
and that mandamus was therefore inappropriate. Id. The decision was presumably grounded on
petitioner's failure to exhaust his administrative remedy, although the Court did not advert to
that shortcoming in those precise terms.
3. The adoption of a federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946 was a major movement
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Some understanding of this judicialization process is critical as legislatures and the legal community contemplate future innovations in administrative procedure. In order to determine precisely when hearings are necessary,
for example, one must first undertake a comprehensive examination of the
reasons for which hearings have been required in various situations in the
past. Similarly, an understanding of when hearings are necessary is an
important prerequisite to determining what kind of hearing is needed and
what qualifications a presiding officer must have in order to realize the goals
of the hearing process. The judicialization process, therefore, deserves a
much more comprehensive analytical and historical description than has yet
been undertaken. The purpose of this Article is to begin that effort by
focusing on three aspects of the phenomenon: first, the development of the
various conceptions of the hearing officer which have evolved in response to
the need for a supervising authority at trial-type administrative hearings;
second, the multiple considerations which may combine to require a trialtype administrative hearing; and third, the changes signaled by the enhanced
status which is being given to presiding officers and their adjudicative
decisions.
EVOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Almost all agencies and departments of government have both
management-level and subordinate employees. Before judicialization of the
administrative process began, the legal implications raised by the use of
subordinates to perform various investigative or evaluational functions were
not serious. 4 As judicialization began, however, judges increasingly took
the position that certain types of governmental actions would not be sustained unless the agency itself had extended the adversely affected party
procedural protections akin to those commonly associated with the judicial
process-basically, notice and an opportunity to be heard. 5 Since these
procedures were deemed to be constitutionally required, the agency action,
however meritorious and substantively within its powers, would be ruled
invalid by a judge if requisite procedural protections had not been extended
by the agency.
The types of governmental actions which were initially subject to these
procedural requirements typically involved controversies which turned on
in the direction of judicialization. See Schotland, After 25 Years: We Come to Praisethe APA
and Not to Bury It, 24 AD. L. REv. 261, 264 (1972); Williams, Fifty Years of the Law of the
FederalAdministrative Agencies-andBeyond, 29 FED. B.J. 267, 268 (1970).

4. The evolution of the process by which subordinate officials conduct hearings on behalf
of agency members is succinctly described in W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND COMMENTS 1043-45 (6th ed. 1974).

5. See, e.g., Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926), discussed in
note 2 supra. For an excellent, concise analysis and description of the decisions through which
the Supreme Court has accomplished a judicialization of administrative law, see Mashaw 28-29.
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"circumstantial" or "adjudicative" facts: 6 for example, whether the shape
of a parcel of real estate justified the application of a purely frontal footage
formula in making assessments for improvements, 7 or whether an applicant8
was eligible to practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals.
Over the years, however, the courts have steadily expanded the spectrum of
individual interests that may not be affected or adjusted without an administrative hearing incorporating at least some elements of the judicial model. 9
Thus, the dismissal or suspension of a public school student, 1 or the
termination of certain types of governmental benefits," have traditionally
failed to receive judicial approval unless prior notice and an opportunity for
an administrative hearing are extended to the affected person or persons.12
The judicial imposition of hearing requirements on administrative agencies
has been paralleled by legislation which also mandates administrative
13
hearings.
Responding to both legislative and judicial commands that some sort of
quasi-judicial procedure precede or accompany certain administrative actions, the agencies fell into the practice of assigning the hearing function (as
they had become accustomed to assigning various other functions) to subordinate employees or officials. 14 The responsibility for deciding who would
preside over the proceedings at which evidence would be taken, testimony
heard and (perhaps) a transcript made, was not exercised with any great
amount of care or concern. The persons so chosen might or might not have
been lawyers; they might or might not have been independent of peer or
6. A useful discussion of the concept of adjudicative fact and the early origins of the

principle requiring a trial for disputed adjudicative facts is presented in K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.03, at 161-62 (3d ed. 1972).

7. See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908).
8. See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
9. See Mashaw 28 n.1 (and cases cited therein). There is evidence that the expansionist

tide in the due process area has begun to ebb. See the authorities cited in note 42 infra.
10.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317(8th

Cir. 1976) (expulsion from medical school), petition for cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 1642 (1977);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
11. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (old age benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397

U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits). But prior notice and an evidentiary hearing need not be given
before administrative termination of social security disability benefits when an evidentiary
hearing is provided before final denial of the disability claim. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976). See also Mashaw 29 n.5 (suggesting that the Court may be shifting ground as regards
the applicability of the due process clause).
12. See generally Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). But
see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), and note 42 infra and accompanying text.
13. One of the first such pieces of legislation was a federal statute in 1906 which authorized
the Interstate Commerce Commission to employ "special agents or examiners who shall have

power to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive evidence." Act of June 29, 1906, ch.
3591, § 7,34 Stat. 595, discussed in 2 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.01 (1958).
14. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 101 (1976). See also note 4 supra.
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staff influence, and they might or might not have been previously involved
in investigative or prosecutorial phases of the proceeding. The sole function
of the early presiding officer was simply to monitor or supervise that phase
of the proceeding wherein the data, information and arguments which the
agency had been told it was required to consider were to be adduced.
The view which validated such a cavalier attitude toward the status and
manner of appointment of the persons presiding at administrative hearings
was that the function of such a presiding officer was almost totally ministerial and in no way influenced the final disposition of the matter at issue. The
assumption was that the presiding officer merely monitored the various
materials submitted by interested parties, organized them, and submitted the
resulting "record" to the agency heads whom the legislature had charged
5
with the responsibility for action or nonaction.'
Beginning about 1917, the Interstate Commerce Commission introduced the system of having its presiding officers (called "examiners")
file proposed reports. 16 This meant that, in addition to monitoring and
processing materials offered by the interested parties, the examiner was to
17
supply his own appraisal, summary, or recommended disposition.
Whether or not it was fully perceived by the initiators of this new system, an
important threshold had been crossed: instead of assuming the passive role
of receiving and organizing submissions for appraisal by the responsible
authority, the presiding officer was assigned the active role of making a
significant contribution to the decisional process in the form of his own
summaries or recommendations.
Alternatives to the practice of having administrative matters initially
heard and processed by a presiding officer were explored episodically by
various federal agencies prior to 1940,18 but in 1941 the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure endorsed the single examiner
15. COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 44-45 (1941). In contrast to the subsequent

enhancement of the hearing officer's status in the federal system, many state agencies' proce-

dures continue to reflect a "ministerial" conception of the officer's functions. See notes 22-24
infra and accompanying text.
16. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 13, §10.01 at 2.
17. Although largely mooted at the federal level by a specific provision of the Administra-

tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970) ("All decisions, including initial, recommended,
and tentative decisions are a part of the record. . ."), the question whether the independently
generated report of the presiding officer should be available to all parties has been a matter of
lively controversy at the state level. See, e.g., Des Plaines Currency Exchange v. Knight, 29 III.
2d 244, 194 N.E.2d 89 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969 (1964); Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J.

498, 105 A.2d 545 (1954); See also Davis, The Missouri Public Service Commission, 42 U. Mo.
KAN. CITY L. REV. 279, 287 (1974).

18. For a description of the Federal Communication Commission's utilization of what may
be called a "committee" for the preparation of its original decision, see 2 K. DAVIS, supra note
13, § 10.01, at 3.
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theory with such vigor that this approach to the problem can easily be said to
have carried the day. 1 9 Although the recommendations of the Committee
were not enacted into law until the passage of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946,20 the concept of an independent presiding officer-now titled
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)-has become a firmly established
tradition within the federal administrative establishment."a
State Law Developments
Developments at the state level have been conspicuously inconsistent.
In contrast to the increased responsibilities and qualifications of federal
Administrative Law Judges, many state statutes continue to reflect the early
view of the presiding officer as a functionary. 2 In Missouri, for example,
responsibility for presiding at initial hearings in workmen's compensation
cases is assigned to agency-appointed employees 3 whose findings are
accorded little significance on judicial review. 2 n Neither the original Model
State Administrative Procedure Act' nor the more recent revised version of
the Act 26 provides for the recognition and appointment of independent
examiners with minimum qualifications for presiding or conducting administrative hearings. North Carolina's recently enacted Administrative
Procedure Act seems to follow this trend by permitting hearings to be
conducted by officers appointed by the agency while apparently imposing
no restrictions on the discretion to appoint.2 7
Other states, such as New York28 and Iowa,2 9 adhere more closely to
the federal model and provide an independent certification process followed
19. COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 15, at 45-46.
20. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970)).
21. Examiners satisfying and appointed pursuant to the requirements of the Administrative

Procedure Act were retitled as "Administrative Law Judges" in 1972. See 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a
(1976). For a useful description of the ALU, see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 103.
22. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.

23. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.610 (Vernon 1965).
24. See Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. App. 1973); Lynn v. Lloyd A. Lynn, Inc.,
493 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. App. 1973).
25. The Model Act may be found in 9C JNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 174-85 (1957).
26. The revised Model Act is set forth in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 245-91 (Master
ed., Supp. 1977).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-33 (Supp. 1975); Daye, North Carolina'sNew Administrative ProcedureAct: An InterpretativeAnalysis, 53 N.C.L. REV. 833, 885-87 (1975).
28. The New York Administrative Procedure.Act apparently makes no independent provi-

sion for the certification of presiding officers at administrative hearings, although it deals
specifically with their powers. N.Y. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§ 303, 304 (56A McKin-

ney Pamph. 1976). The Civil Service Law, however, provides for examination and classification of categories of employees, and it is apparently through this mechanism that a system
similar to the federal system is implemented. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 97 (McKinney 1973).
29. IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A. 11(2) (West Supp. 1976).
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by assignment of those certified to particular agencies. California probably
goes the farthest by establishing an Office of Administrative Hearings
consisting of about twenty hearing officers and other suitable staff. 30 Unless
exempted by statute, agencies which must conduct trial-type hearings under
the California Administrative Procedure Act are required to use hearing
officers supplied by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Office is
also free to contract with other agencies which hold trial-type hearings to
provide hearing officers to such agencies for that purpose. 31 The significant
aspect of the California approach, however, is that no hearing officer is
assigned to any particular agency. It is in this respect that the California
system differs most markedly from the. federal model.
Florida has modeled its new system after that of California, with a few
modifications. The most interesting difference between the two acts is
Florida's provision for the appointment of an uncertified hearing officer in
the event that a certified hearing officer is unavailable. Such a person must
come from the staff of an agency other than the one for which the hearing is
to be conducted. 32
The present system in Missouri might best be described as a compromise between the traditional systems and that innovated by California. Most
of the non-licensing agencies which are required by law to conduct hearings
in various specified circumstances must do so in compliance with the
requirements of the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, 33 and they are
granted discretion to conduct such hearings through the use of hearing
officers or examiners. 34 The law imposes no explicit limitations on the
qualifications such officers or examiners must exhibit or on the method by
which they are selected. With respect to most licensing agencies, however,
hearings are conducted by a unique institution known as the Administrative
Hearing Commission which, at present, consists of only one Commissioner. 35 The Commissioner must satisfy statutorily imposed qualifications.
He is appointed by the governor rather than the particular agency or agencies
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11370-11370.5 (West 1966); id. § 11512 (Supp. 1977); Coan,
OperationalAspects of a CentralHearingExaminersPool: California'sExperiences, 3 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 86 (1975).
31. Coan, supra note 30, at 87.
32. FLA. STAT. ANN § 120.65 (West Supp. 1977). For a comprehensive, analytical and
illuminating description and explanation of the innovative Florida Act, see Levinson, The
FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 617 (1975).

33. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1977).
34. Although the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act makes no provision for "hearing
officers," the practice of delegating the responsibility for conducting hearings in contested
cases to a subordinate officer is widespread. See David, supra note 17, at 286.
35.

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 161.252 (Vernon Supp. 1977).
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he serves; thus, unlike37the federal ALJ, 36 the Commissioner has no ties to
any particular agency.
WHEN SHOULD A TRIAL-TYPE HEARING BE REQUIRED?

A subject which deserves far more attention than it has yet been given
by administrative law scholars concerns the criteria which determine when
an administrative hearing is required and the procedural amenities which
must be observed at such a hearing. Since the services of an independent
presiding officer are normally needed only in the event of a trial-type
hearing, a brief review of the circumstances which may call for such a
hearing is appropriate.
A categorical analysis of the question indicates at least four situations
which may require an administrative hearing: (1) procedural due process
requirements of either a state or the federal constitution; 38 (2) a general
legislative requirement imposed by the provisions of an administrative
procedure act; 39 (3) a specific requirement imposed by the legislature when
it created the agency in question; 40 and (4) a "self-certification" process by
which one of the parties alleges that despite the form of the proceeding,
there are issues of circumstantial or adjudicative fact which require the grant
of an administrative hearing. 4 1 While the distinctions may become blurred
as a result of several recent Supreme Court cases which give great weight to
statutory procedures in determining constitutional due process interests, 42 it
is nonetheless important to keep in mind that any of these four types of
requirements may be used to support a right to an administrative hearing in a
particular case.
36. See generally Karl Stecher, 11 Ad.L.2d 868 (Civil Serv. Comm'n 1961).
37. Mo. ANN. STAT. §161.252 (Vernon Supp. 1977). For a comprehensive discussion of the

Missouri Administrative Commission see Special Project-Fair Treatment for the Licensed
Professional:The Missouri Administrative HearingCommission, 37 Mo. L. REV. 410 (1972).

38. See generally Mashaw; Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law,
1974 DUKE L.J. 89.
39. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1970); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT §§
1(3), 8 (1946); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT REVISED §§ 1(2), 9 (1961).
40. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 371-377 (1970); 41 U.S.C. § 43a(b) (1970). See generally Hamilton,

Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276 (1972).

41. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §120.57 (West Supp. 1977). For a full discussion of the so-called
"self-certification" procedure see Levinson, supra note 32, at 658-59.

42. See Codd v. Velger, 97 S.Ct. 882 (1970); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Rabin, Job Security
and Due Process:MonitoringAdministrativeDiscretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 60 (1976); Note, DemocraticDue Process:Administrative ProcedureAfter Bishop
v. Wood, 1977 DUKE L.J. 453. To the extent that the trend suggested by these authorities
continues to dominate future analyses of the right to be heard, the suggestion put forward in this
Article that the legislature must balance the factors and policies which underlie hearing requirements more carefully and explicitly takes on added force. Such legislative judgments may fully
control due process requirements in the future.
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Where they have found a hearing constitutionally required, the courts
have traditionally considered at least four factors in determining what
elements of a trial-type proceeding must be employed by the administrative
agency. The courts have examined: (1) the "value" of the aggrieved
person's interest; 43 (2) the relative selectivity of the administrative action,
i.e., the degree to which it affects this person but not others similarly
situated or in the same class;' (3) the effect of a hearing requirement on the
capacity of the administrative program to attain its goals;45 and (4) the extent
and directness of governmental involvement in the activity affecting those
who seek a hearing. 46 Beyond that it is difficult to go. It is often impossible
to predict whether a particular component of administrative due process will
be required in any particular situation. The ad hoc approach which has been
taken by the courts47 is not very helpful in deciding, for example, whether,
in a situation where a hearing is clearly called for, the aggrieved person is
entitled to representation by counsel (whether he can pay for it or not). Nor
does it resolve the question whether he should receive the protection of a
presiding officer who has not participated in any of the prosecutorial or
48
investigative phases of the case.
What the developing case law does, though, is to provide a framework
for making rational judgments. While it does not offer the kind of precision
which the language of an administrative procedure act might provide, 49 the
43. See Mashaw 28-30; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1717-22 (1975).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U;S. 224, 245-46 (1973); BiMetallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).

45. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580-82 (1975). In Goss, even the majority agreed that
where the value of the governmental interest was sufficiently intense, the procedural due

process requirements might yield. "Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to
persons or property . . . may be immediately removed from school." Id. at 582. See also

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320-23 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-70
(1974).
46. See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1246-49 (1st Cir. 1970) (governmental involvement

in housing subsidy program insufficiently direct to justify imposition of trial-type hearing prior
to rent increase).
47. See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961): "The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the

circumstances of the particular case." Language indicating that the procedures applicable to
the administrative hearing will vary with the many factors involved in the dispute is common to
almost every case contributing to the "due process explosion" that followed the decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35
(1975). The Mathews decision is criticized in Mashaw.
48. For a discussion of the constitutional requirement of an impartial presiding officer see
Davis, Withrow v. Larkin and the "Separation of Functions" Concept in State Administrative
Proceedings, 27 AD. L. REv. 407 (1975); Friendly, supra note 12, at 1279-80.
49. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that judicial pronouncements in this area have
occasionally been less than illuminating:
While the line dividing them may not always be a bright one, these decisions
represent a recognized distinction in administrative law between proceedings for the
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case law is at least pragmatic in its attempt to balance conflicting policy
objectives such as fairness, accuracy, efficiency and legitimacy in fashioning procedural requirements. To the extent that the judiciary is not the
proper forum for establishing general procedural requirements which can be
applied in every situation, legislation must reflect these various concerns.
Regrettably, draftsmen have made little effort to incorporate the insights of the judicial experience into statutory procedures. The formulae
employed by the leading statutes-the federal Administrative Procedure
Act, 50 the Model State Administrative Procedure Act51 and the revised
Model State Administrative Procedure Act 2-- to identify when a particular
administrative proceeding requires a trial-type hearing are uniformly unsatisfactory. Instead of addressing themselves to the actual circumstances
which may, in the interests of accuracy and acceptability, justify a sacrifice
of efficiency through the imposition of a trial-type hearing, these statutes
effectively sidestep the issue by providing for a trial-type hearing only
where a "hearing" may be otherwise required by "law," or by some statute
53
other than the administrative procedure act itself.
The technique employed by these administrative procedure acts has
been widely followed, with unfortunate results. Trial-type hearings are
frequently required where they are unnecessary to achieve goals of accuracy, efficiency and acceptability. In many other instances such hearings are
not required although a pragmatic analysis of the circumstances indicates
that these goals could be better served by a trial-type hearing without undue
purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases on the other.
United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973). The words from Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion quoted above bear comparison with words from another era, in
this case those of Justice Frankfurter, conceding that his judicial formula provided no litmus
test:
We are aware that to give the examiner's findings less finality than a master's
and yet entitle them to consideration in striking the account, is to introduce another
and an unruly factor into the judgmatical process of review. But we ought not to
fashion an exclusionary rule merely to reduce the number of imponderables to be
considered by reviewing courts.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493 (1951).
50. "[E]very case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
" 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970).
opportunity for agency hearing ....
51. "[A] proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of
specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency
hearing." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 1(3) (1946).
52. "[A] proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, [price fixing], and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AT REVISED § 1(2) (1961).
53. No matter how "circumstantial" or "adjudicative" the facts, and no matter how
selective in application the exercise of agency power may be, the federal Administrative
Procedure Act's trial-type hearing requirements do not apply in the absence of an independent
statutory requirement for a hearing. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973).
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impairment of the efficiency of the administrative process. 54 The problem is
particularly nettlesome because of the relative inflexibility of the many
administrative procedure acts which ordain a particular complex of adjudicative procedures and either apply them or do not. Hybrid procedures
must be devised to accommodate the various conflicting interests in the
55
administrative process.
It must be emphasized that a statute which establishes the requirement
of a hearing as a condition precedent to valid administrative action does not
always reflect a measured legislative judgment in pursuit of the goals of
accuracy, efficiency and acceptability. Experience suggests that the decision
to require a hearing frequently results from political considerations or from
partisan trade-offs within the political process itself.5 6 There may even be
situations in which the particular legislation creating and establishing the
agency imposes procedural safeguards more extensive than the trial-type
hearings required by the applicable administrative procedure act. 7 In any
event, there appears to be a growing skepticism towards the assumption that
the benefits of trial-type hearings will almost always outweigh the costs.
This skepticism should provide the occasion for reexamining the question
whether the traditional administrative procedure act methods for identifying
the circumstances in which a trial-type hearing is appropriate are worth
58
retaining.
Legislative authorities should follow the lead of the judiciary by
balancing the factors involved in determining the appropriateness of a
hearing, and by attempting to fashion statutory procedures that fit the needs
of individual administrative programs. In a series of recent decisions, the
United States Supreme Court has already begun to generate an elaborate but
flexible constitutional "code" of procedural requirements for administrative
adjudications. 59 This "code" should be carefully compared with the proce54. See note 67 infra. For a thoughtful and restrained appraisal of the current methodology
of determining the propriety of a trial-type hearing in a particular instance, together with a
modest proposal for reform, see Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear
Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REV. 585 (1972).
55. See note 61 infra.

56. The role of special interest groups in winning legislative impositions of trial-type
hearings as conditions to the exercise of agency authority is difficult to document. However,
little doubt exists as to the refined implementation of such tactics by powerful groups interested

in slowing, blocking or blunting unwanted regulation. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 40, at
1288.

57. For some classic examples, see Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and
Drug Administration, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1132 (1972), and the statutes cited at note 40 supra.
58.

See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Tial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex

Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1972).
59. The Supreme Court decisions which can be said, collectively, to establish a constitutionally derived "code" of administrative procedure are conveniently identified in a useful
footnote in Mashaw 28 n.1. See also Comment, ProceduralDue Processafter Goss v. Lopez,
1976 DUKE L.J. 409.
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dures imposed by statutes and the criteria employed by those statutes for
identifying the types of proceedings to which these procedural requirements
are applicable. Such a comparison may well indicate that the "code" which
courts have been articulating on a case-by-case basis, although not as
precise as administrative procedure acts in identifying the procedural requirements imposed or the proceedings in which the safeguards must be
observed, is nevertheless a more realistic and practical basis for accommodating the goals of accuracy and acceptability with the increasingly
significant goal of efficiency. 60 In stronger terms, the question may be asked
whether this remarkable body of case law applicable to administrative
adjudication has not made the analogous provisions of the various adminis61
trative procedure acts obsolete.
Another possible method for identifying the circumstances in which a
trial-type hearing may be required is suggested by the recently enacted
Florida Administrative Procedure Act. 62 The Florida approach may, for lack
of a better term, be described as the "self-certification" technique. The
Florida Act distinguishes between formal and informal hearings and limits
the former to those cases in which a disputed issue of material fact is
involved. 63 Whether formal or informal, a hearing is required only if a
"substantial interest" of a party is affected. 64 The Act purports to determine, on its own and without reference to other statutes, whether a hearing
is mandatory and, if so, the type of proceeding required. 65 In other words, it
establishes a general framework which can be used to determine what
hearing procedures are required in any particular situation. The Act also
brings a great deal of flexibility to administrative adjudication. Because it
permits a hearing to be converted from formal to informal after a proceeding
has been in progress for some time, 66 some procedural issues can be left
until the presiding officer is fully acquainted with the issues and interests
60. See generally Cramton, supra note 54.
61.

A number of opinions in recent years have noted that the polar choices imposed by the

federal Administrative Procedure Act are not a satisfactory response to many of the pragmatic
requirements of complex and sophisticated regulatory programs. See, e.g., United States v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973), clearly holding that while a particular administrative proceeding might not be subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557 (1970)

because of the absence of the magic words "on the record," the circumstances might otherwise
require elements of a trial-type hearing above and beyond those required by the simple "notice

and comment" procedure mandated by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). See also United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,757 (1972); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238

(D.C. Cir. 1973).
62.
63.
64.
65.

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.50-.73 (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 120.57.
Id.
Id. §§ 120.57(1)(b)(1), .57(2)(a)(2); see Levinson, supra note 32, at 666-68.

66. Levinson, supra note 32, at 666 n.284.
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involved, and procedures can be modified so that foundations for procedural
challenges on appeal can be avoided.
By determining both the requirement of a hearing and the quality of the
procedure on an ad hoe basis (depending upon whether a "substantial
interest" of a party is involved and whether there is a "disputed issue of
fact"), the Florida Act may simply reflect already recognized constitutional
requirements. In any event, it constitutes a marked departure from conventional methods for resolving this question, and its effectiveness should be a
matter for close and continuing study.
The legal. community must attempt to identify the type of administrative proceedings for which trial-type procedures are appropriate and the
particular procedures that are needed in individual contexts. Permitting such
questions to turn on the sterile inquiry whether there is legislation calling for
a "hearing" has undoubtedly resulted in poor decisions. Trial-type procedures are frequently required when they are inappropriate and omitted when
they are needed. 67 Fair and efficient operation of the administrative process
demands the development of a richer conceptual framework for discussing
the appropriateness of various hearing-type procedures and concomitant
legislative reform.
SELECrION OF A PRESIDING OFFICER

There is a second important reason to develop a better understanding of
administrative hearings: it is difficult even to begin to discuss the role of the
administrative law judge unless the hearing over which he will preside is
fully understood. At the present time, the only situation in which it can be
67.

Forceful and persuasive arguments have been made against the use of trial-type

hearings in federal rule-making proceedings, where such hearings are required simply because
independent statutes call for hearings on the record. See Hamilton, supra note 40; Hamilton,
supra note 57; Westwood, Administrative Proceedings:Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.B.A.J.

659 (1964). On the other hand, disputes arising in connection with applications for federal bank
charters are not independently subjected to hearing requirements so that the trial-type procedures of the federal Administrative Procedure Act do not apply. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
140-41 (1973). Yet it has been argued with equal force that the character of the factual disputes

and the nature of the interests involved in bank charter applications are conspicuously appropriate for at least some of the procedural protections commonly associated with trial-type
hearings. Indeed, a resolution recently adopted by the Council of the Section of Administrative

Law of the American Bar Association recommends that the Association's House of Delegates
endorse the proposition that de novo bank chartering proceedings be subject to the trial-type
hearing requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1970). SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. ABA,
MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL AND SECTION 14-23 (Aug. 7-11, 1976),
reproduced in 13 SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ABA, ANNUAL REPORTS OF COMMITrEES

281-90 (1976). See also Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of the Federal
Banking Agencies, 42 U.CmI. L. REV. 235, 290 (1975). Professor Scott is dubious about the need
for trial-type hearings, but clearly indicates that the wind is blowing in the direction of more
structured and open decision-making in the chartering function with safeguards to assure those
affected that discretion is being exercised fairly and rationally.
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said that the presence of an independent hearing officer is absolutely required is where a statutory provision explicitly calls for such an officer. In
its decade-long development of a constitutionally required minimum administrative due process code, the United States Supreme Court has occa68
sionally referred to the requirement of an independent decisional authority,
but it has so far declined to spell out either the professional qualifications or
any selection constraints constitutionally applicable to them, other than
freedom from disabling bias. In order to begin to fill this void, the following
discussion attempts a comparison of the various methods currently being
employed for the selection of presiding officers in those cases where their
function is mandated by statute. The same policy considerations are also
relevant in deciding, when there is no such legislative command, whether a
presiding officer is required by any constitutionally inferred "rudimentary
due process" and, if so, the nature of that officer's credentials and the
degree of his independence.
Assuming that a class of proceedings can be identified in which
judge-like presiding officers are required by statute, it is obvious that the
federal system of providing independently certified ALJs, who then (although retaining a theoretical independence) become more or less permanently associated with the agency for which they conduct hearings, is not the
only method. Although the federal approach has been followed in a number
of states, 69 it does have several disadvantages.
The most significant difficulty with the federal approach is that the
AL's experiences are typically confined to recurring types of disputes
common to the agency for which he works. At the CAB, he is concerned
with such things as route certifications; at the NLRB, with unfair labor
practice disputes. This state of affairs is widely thought to give the ALJ an
expertise which contributes to the efficiency of the administrative process.
However, such forced specialization ignores the original reasons for creation of the position of ALJ-impartiality, objectivity and independence
appear to have been stronger considerations than that of expertise. 70 Former
American Bar Association President Bernard G. Segal has put it this way:
The most persistent argument against unification is that an administrative law judge must be expert in the substantive law of the agency. I am
68. "And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential .

. .

. We agree with the

District Court that prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare
official from acting as a decision maker. He should not, however, have participated in making
the determination under review." Goldberg . Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). See also
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-70 (1974);
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
69. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE. supra note 15, at 45-50; HOOVER
COMMISSION REPORT

88-93;

HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT 257-69.
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no more persuaded by this thesis than I am that we need to have
specialized judges in our federal court system. I realize that administrative law judges function in very specialized areas of the law, but so do
federal district judges, and yet they have demonstrated no ineptitude in
making findings and reaching conclusions in the most technical disciplines. Like the district judge in a nonjury trial, administrative law
judges are largely finders of facts. They are not "special masters,"
advisers, or counselors. Their function is to judge, after hearing counsel and the testimony and doing the necessary analyzing, weighing, and
studying, cape by case, issue by issue. To the extent that impartial,
technical advice or instruction might be desirable, this could be provided by a cadre of experts to be available to administrative law judges
71
generally.
In addition to the fact that the ALJ position was not designed with an
eye toward special expertise, specialization may put a presiding officer at a
distinct disadvantage in the discharge of his function as a fact-finder. 72 As
an eminent jurist observed, "One of the dangers of extraordinary experience
is that those who have it may fall into the grooves created by their own
expertness." 73 Fact-finders with great expertise in a particular area may
have such strong preconceptions about certain problems that they will not be
able to evaluate evidence or arguments before them fairly or accurately.
To the extent that efforts are directed at insuring a presiding officer
who is fair, objective and free from institutionally acquired biases, the
present system of permanent assignment of ALJs to particular agencies
seems distinctly counterproductive. The current federal approach encourages a closed-circuit system which may well deprive agencies of mature and
competent ALJs while at the same time creating at least the appearance of
bias in favor of the agency. 74 This system has been described as one of
71. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead,
62 A.B.A.J. 1424, 1424-25 (1976).
72. An early recognition and discussion of the value of rotating ALJs between agencies so
that capacities for judgment would be sharpened by exposure to a greater diversity of disputes

can be found in Macy, The APA and the HearingExaminer: Products of a Viable Political
Society, 27 FED. B.J. 351, 388-93 (1967); cf. Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Adminis-

trative Law Judge, 25 AD. L. REv. 9, 38-39 (1973). For a discussion of the shortcomings of
expertise and an argument that specialization has been "oversold" in the United States, see
Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in Regulated Industries:An Abdication of Judicial

Responsiblity, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 471-75 (1954). See also What the Justices Are Saying, 62
A.B.A.J. 1454, 1456 (1976):

Justice Powell: "My brothers gently rejected my proposal [for a staff of experts]

reminding me that I was being paid to render personal judgments, even if they were

devoid of expertise"; Justice Rehnquist: "Somewhere there comes a tipping point
. ..at which the number of routine and uninteresting tasks. . . becomes so large a
portion of the whole that the number of qualified people willing to take the job

diminishes sharply."
73. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953)
(Wyzanski, J.).
74.

Segal, supra note 71, at 1426; Miller, The Education and Development of Administra-
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"selective certification," '7 5 although that term does not clearly describe all
that is involved in the process. Under the present system, the Civil Service
Commission subjects applicants for positions as administrative law judges
to examinations and interviews. Persons who meet the requirements are then
"certified" and placed on a "register" which is supplied to an agency on
request. 76 Although cumbersome and exacting, the Civil Service Commission's standards are relatively neutral. Under the system of selective certification, however, the agencies are permitted to impose their own qualifications, in addition to those employed by the Civil Service Commission, as
conditions for appointment as an ALJ. These agency qualifications typically
take the form of a requirement that the applicant have two years of recent
experience in the field of administrative law, or, occasionally, that the
applicant be familiar with the substantive administrative law of the agency
by which he or she is to be employed.77
The result of the selective certification process is to give attorneys on
the staffs of particular federal agencies a decided advantage over other
applicants. At one time it was pointed out that as a result of this selective
certification process, over two-thirds of the NLRB ALJs were former
employees of the Board, and fifty percent of the ICC ALJs had in fact been
employed by the Commission at the time of their appointment. 78
In addition to the possibility of depriving the agency of the most
competent candidates for their AL openings, selective certification creates
an unhealthy appearance of institutional bias. As Bernard Segal has pointed
out, "The permanent assignment of an administrative law judge to a single
agency. . . tends to produce an inbreeding, which in turn contributes even
more to the appearance of bias. For example, of the thirteen administrative
law judges assigned to the Federal Trade Commission, twelve are former
79
employees of that commission." ,
A different approach from the federal system is taken by both California and Florida. At least as regards those agencies which are required to
tive Law Judges, 25 AD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1973). "The defects of selective certification rot the entire
recruitment and appointment process. . . [Tihey undermine confidence in the administrative
process ...
" 6 SECTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ABA, ANNUAL REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
20 (1969).
75. See Miller, The Vice of Selective Certification in the Appointment of HearingExaminers, 20 AD. L. REV. 477 (1968).
76. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, at 293-94.

77. Miller, supra note 75, at 483.
78. Id. 480.
79. Segal, supra note 71, at 1426. The related ethical problems posed by the "migration" of

attorneys between federal agency staffs and private law firms representing clients before those
same agencies, and some of the solutions currently under consideration, are discussed in Note,
Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual
Disqualification?,1977 DUKE L.J. 512.
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utilize independent hearing officers, those officers are supplied by a central
agency and are neither employed by nor permanently assigned to the agency
for which they conduct hearings.80 At the federal level, the movement
towards the creation of an independent corps of administrative law judges
represents a trend in the direction of the approaches already taken. by
81
California and Florida.
A third approach takes the agency out of the adjudication business
altogether. This result can be achieved by withdrawing the power of an
agency to reject, revise or modify the AL's decision; in other words, to
make the decision of the ALJ the "final word" of the agency. Another
method of accomplishing the same objective is simply to establish an
Administrative Court, independent from the agency and exercising full
power of adjudication over disputes between the private sector and the
82
agency.
Something akin to this third approach was recently adopted in Missouri
when that state created an Administrative Hearings Commission with jurisdiction over disputes between various professional licensing boards and
those who are subject to such licensing.8 3 With respect to proceedings
charging an existing licensee with misconduct, the Commission is empowered only to make recommendations to the licensing agency; 84 with respect
to a refusal to license, however, the Commission is empowered to issue an
"order. "85 At the present time, legislation is pending before the Missouri
General Assembly which would significantly enlarge the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Hearing Commission to encompass vast new areas of state
licensing functions including those now exercised by the Health Division of
the Department of Social Services, as well as all tax disputes (other than
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN.
(West Supp. 1977).

§§

11370.1-.3 (West Supp. 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65

81. At the federal level, the idea of an "independent corps" goes back at least as far as
1941, when an official proposal was made for a modest interchange between agencies. COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, supra note 15, at 49. A limited version of this concept was

later endorsed by the then-Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission. Macy,
supra note 72, at 388-92. Only recently, however, has it been forcefully proposed that the
system adopted in Califormia and Florida be accepted at the federal level. See Segal, supra
note 71.
82. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT 87-88; HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE Report 246.
The literature on the proposal to establish an Administrative Court is extensive. An especially

thorough and thoughtful study is Fuchs, The Hoover Commission and Task ForceReports on
Legal Services and Procedure, 31 IND. L.J. 1, 16-22 (1955).

83. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 161.252 (Vernon Supp. 1977). See also Special Project, supra note
37. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.

84. "The commission may make recommendations as to appropriate disciplinary action but
any such recommendations shall not be binding upon the agency." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 161.292
(Vernon Supp. 1977).

85. "[tMrhe administrative hearing commission shall issue an appropriate order to accomplish such examination or licensure or renewal, as the case may be." Id. § 161.302.
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property valuation and assessment) with the Department of Revenue.1 6 The
legislation would also authorize expansion of the number of commissioners
presently allowed, 87 and would permit the
from the single commissioner 88
panels.
commissioners to sit in
The effect of the Missouri reforms would be to identify the particular
classes of disputes (licensing and taxation) which are highly selective as to
the individual affected, which touch interests to which our legal system has
traditionally given careful protection, and which typically involve circumstantial or adjudicative facts. The Missouri reforms would take these disputes out of the agencies (where they are presently adjudicated, on the
record, before an agency hearing examiner) and transfer them to an
independent hearing commission which in many ways would exercise the
functions of an administrative court. Whenever a dispute within those areas
became a "contested case" so that a trial-type hearing on the record was
required, it would no longer be subject to administrative adjudication by the
department or division involved; such controversies would be heard by the
Administrative Hearing Commission.
It is important to emphasize that the Missouri reforms do not limit the
powers of the licensing agencies or the Department of Revenue to negotiate
informally with persons subject to their jurisdiction, nor is discretion necessarily limited. The reforms would merely subject a large class of disputes for
which trial-type hearings are statutorily required to the jurisdiction of an
adjudicative authority, the Administrative Hearing Commission, which is
totally independent from the agency or department with whom the objector
is having a dispute.
The Missouri reforms, whether consciously or otherwise, reflect one of
the more controversial proposals of the so-called Second Hoover Commission, which concluded that experience with the administrative process had
reached a point where it was expedient to transfer jurisdiction over certain
recurring types of disputes to an Administrative Court. 89 The Missouri
Administrative Hearing Commission can make only non-binding "recom86. S. 106, 79th Gen. Ass. of the State of Missouri, 1st Reg. Sess. §§ 190.171-198.430,

202.915, 311.680-.691 (1977). The foregoing provisions confer jurisdiction over the licensing
activities of the Division of Health, the Department of Mental Health and the Supervisor of

Liquor Control on the Administrative Hearing Commission. Jurisdiction over revenue disputes
would be conferred by id. §§ 136.245-.310, 142.080-149.035.

87. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
88. S. 106,.79th Gen. Ass. of the State of Missouri, 1st Reg. Sess. § 161.252 (1977).
89. See HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT 84-88; HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT
246-50. Although the final report recommended such a transfer of jurisdiction for trade,
taxation and labor disputes, the Task Force Report had only called for the transfer of trade and
taxation matters. Compare HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT 87-88 with HOOVER COMMISSION TASK
FORCE REPORT 246.
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9°
mendations" with respect to misconduct of which it finds licensees guilty.
91
But in all other respects, such as the ordering of licensure or examination,
its decisions achieve the finality envisioned by members of the Hoover
Commission and its Task Force, who believed that in certain areas experience justified a transfer of decision-making authority to an Administrative
Court. 9 2

THE NEED FOR REFORM

The widely followed federal system uses statutory referents to identify
proceedings which require a presiding officer. 93 While assigned to the
agency, the federal presiding officer (ALJ) is independently certified and
has his or her level of compensation established by the Civil Service
Commission. 94 The federal approach seems to have three major drawbacks,
however. Two of them have already been discussed. The first involves the
absence of perspectives and enhanced capacity for analogy which is arguably a consequence of the so-called "specialization" encouraged by the
present system. 95 The second disadvantage is the system's amenability to
processes of selective certification, which may eliminate highly qualified
persons for the ALJ eligibility lists and may create appearances of
96
partiality.
The Problem of Finality
A third problem with the federal approach has received little attention.
It involves the possible frustration or rejection of a judicial-type decision on
policy or political grounds by agency members who do not necessarily have
the judicial competence of the ALJ. 97 It may well be that the effective
implementation of policy requires that final adjudicatory responsibility be
vested in the agency itself or the appropriate cabinet member; it may even be
that this is technically a requirement of the Constitution. 98 Nevertheless, the
fact remains that under the present system the decision of an ALJ, reached
after a trial-type hearing which includes many, if not most, of the proce90. See note 84 supra.
91. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 161.302 (Vernon Supp. 1977).
92. See note 105 infra and accompanying text.
93. See note 50 and text accompanying note 53 supra.
94. 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (1970); see Zwerdling, supra note 72, at 12-14. See generally B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 14, § 103.
95. See notes 70-73 supra and accompanying text.
96. See fiotes 74-79 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Lorch, Administrative Court via the Independent HearingOfficer, 51 IUDICATURE
114 (1967).
98. The full "separation of powers" implications of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),

are yet to be determined. See generally Note, CongressionalVeto of AdministrativeAction: The
ProbableResponse to a ConstitutionalChallenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285.
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dures common to the judicial process, may nevertheless be rejected or
modified by an "appellate" body which does not have a judicial
composition.
It is noteworthy that the current proposals for establishing an independent corps of administrative law judges within the federal system would
overcome only two of the three drawbacks mentioned above. 99 An independent corps of ALJs moving relatively freely among agencies would
develop the background and breadth which some critics claim the present
system discourages. Since no ALJ in, an independent corps would be
assigned to any particular agency, the selective certification abuse would
likewise automatically disappear. Nevertheless, under an independent corps
system the AL's decision would still, in most cases, be subject to agency
rejection or revision.
It is with the last of the three drawbacks that the Hoover Commission
recommendations and, in certain areas at least, the Missouri reforms would
deal. Once a dispute has been the subject of a trial-type hearing before an
administrative tribunal which is independent of the particular governmental
entity involved in the dispute, it should be reviewable only in an Article I
court and not subject to executive revision or rejection. 100 Current proposals
for the creation of an independent corps of administrative law judges at the
federal level do not so provide, and this common deficiency must be
remedied if the advantages of finality in administrative adjudication are to
be fully realized. 101
Among other manifestations of the accelerating judicialization of the
administrative process, one can discern a tendency to give the decisions of
presiding officers increased dignity and weight.102 In many instances, the
decision of the federal ALl now becomes the decision of the agency "...
unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time
provided by rule." 10 3 Paralleling this development have been noticeable
trends towards an upgrading of qualifications for presiding officers so that
today, at least at the federal level, many of these persons are truly judges
whose decisions may be as carefully reasoned and based upon proof adductions as elaborate as those of an ordinary judicial proceeding." ° In light of
99.

Compare Segal, supra note 71 with Lorch, supra note 97.

100. See

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 49-50 (1971);

Lorch, supra note 97, at 116-17.
101. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 100.
102. Macy, supra note 72, at 380-88; Schotland, supra note 3, at 268-70.
103. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1970).
104. See Gillilland, The Certiorari-Type Review, 26 AD. L. REV. 53 (1974) (arguing that the
experience and talents of the ALJs justify the Civil Aeronautics Board's policy of giving the
ALI's decision final effect unless reviewed on motion of the Board); Segal, supra note 71;
Zwerdling, supra note 72.
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all this it may be appropriate to consider whether there are areas where the
agency itself should not engage in adjudication, leaving such matters to an
independent body. The words of the Hoover Commission Task Force may
have been more prophetic in this respect than was first realized:
When agencies are established to explore a new area of regulation, it is
expedient to combine in them all the powers which are needed to
achieve maximum* effectiveness, even at the cost of consolidating
judicial and legislative functions. Subsequently, it may be feasible to
transfer certain primarily judicial functions to the courts.
The application of judicial remedies by the executive branch need
not be surrendered in the first instance to courts of general jurisdiction.
The new function may warrant a new court. 105
In Missouri, at least as far as licensing is concerned, that "new court"
is the Administrative Hearing Commission, and, under legislation presently
proposed, its jurisdiction stands to be expanded significantly.' 6 At the
federal level, there is discernible movement in the same direction, though it
is not yet completed in any particular area. However, the increased dignity
being accorded the office of the ALJ, the proposals presently being submitted for the creation of an independent corps of ALJs, and the enhanced
weight being given to ALJ decisions under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act combine to signal a development towards giving the ALJ the
final decision, at least in certain areas of adjudication. If and when that point
is reached, we will have the Hoover Commission's "Administrative
07
Court." ,1
105.

HOOVER COMMISSION TASK FORCE REPORT 241.

106. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Lorch, supra note 97; cf. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 100, at
47-58 (1971); Caldwell, A FederalAdministrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 966 (1936); Lorch,
The FederalAdministrative Court Idea, 52 A.B.A.J. 635 (1966).

